Академия Корана:Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān/ʿAbduh, Muḥammad

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Johanna Pink, "ʿAbduh, Muḥammad" in: Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, General Editor: J. D. McAuliffe, Georgetown University, Washington DC.

Muḥammad ʿAbduh was born around 1849 into a farming family in the Nile Delta. He received a traditional religious education, first at home, then in Ṭanṭā, and finally at Cairo’s Azhar mosque. In 1872 he started studying with Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-97), an Iranian political activist who tried to acquire a following for his anti-British agenda. Al-Afghānī introduced ʿAbduh to scholars such as Avicenna (370-428/980-1037) and Ibn Khaldūn (732-808/1332-1406), and exposed him to translations of European works on history, sociology, and political thought. In 1877 ʿAbduh received the degree of ʿālimiyya, which allowed him to teach at al-Azhar. He then became involved in politics and made his first forays into journalism. In 1880 he attained the post of editor-in-chief of Egypt’s official journal al-Waqāʾiʿ al-Miṣriyya (“Egyptian Affairs”). The views he expressed in his editorials were mostly concerned with social and moral questions, but some issues, such as polygamy, required a new interpretation of the Qurʾān that ʿAbduh later delivered.

In 1881 and 1882 ʿAbduh lent his support to the constitutionalist branch of the ʿUrābist movement, which rebelled against European control of Egyptian politics. When the British army deposed Aḥmad ʿUrābī, then de facto head of the Egyptian government, in September 1882, ʿAbduh was arrested and exiled. He joined al-Afghānī in Paris, where they published the journal al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā («The firmest handhold») over a period of nine months in 1884. It was arguably the first attempt in Arabic to build a political programme — in this case, a militantly anti-imperialist one — on arguments drawn from the Qurʾān, and despite its low circulation it seems to have been rather influential. Towards the end of 1884, ʿAbduh left Paris and broke with al-Afghānī for reasons that are unclear, but may have something to do with his rejection of the latter’s radical and militant approach towards fighting European domination of Muslim territories. ʿAbduh then taught theology, history, and Arabic literature at a progressive school in Beirut, before finally being allowed to return to Egypt in 1888.

After the death of the khedive Tawfīq in 1892, ʿAbduh gained the favour of Tawfīq’s successor ʿAbbās Ḥilmī II (1874—1944) and rose to high positions in Egypt. In 1894 he was appointed to the Azhar Administrative Council, and in 1899 became Mufti of Egypt. In this prestigious position he did not limit himself to writing fatwas, but also published in newspapers, wrote books, and gave lectures, especially on the subject of Qurʾānic exegesis. After several years in the office, he had to respond to increasing opposition from Azhar scholars, the khedive, and parts of the press who criticised and ridiculed him for his European habits, the unorthodox views he had expressed in a number of controversial fatwas, and his good relations with the British. Under pressure from all sides, and close to losing his position as Mufti, ʿAbduh died of cancer in Alexandria on 11 July 1905 (Sedgwick; Amīn, 25-56; Adams, 18-103).

Al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā and the Qurʾān

Al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā, the journal that ʿAbduh published together with Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī in Paris, had a strong anti-British and pan-Islamist agenda in which the religion of Islam is seen as central to anti-imperialist resistance in the Muslim world. There is no scholarly consensus on the extent to which ʿAbduh was responsible for the journal’s content (Hildebrandt, 229, n. 64, with further references; Hamzah, 43-4); the articles in the journal vary in approach and content which suggests that ʿAbduh’s contribution might be more important in some cases than in others. It seems plausible that the Qurʾān-centred articles in particular were largely shaped by ʿAbduh since such interests are not documented in al-Afghānī’s other writings, but figure importantly in ʿAbduh’s. Whichever is the case, ʿAbduh and al-Afghānī assumed joint responsibility for the journal’s contents.

The importance of the Qurʾān for al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā is evidenced by the fact that the journal’s title is itself a reference to the Qurʾān (Q 2:256, 31:22), and it contains many articles that are headed by Qurʾānic quotations. None of these actually aim at interpreting the Qurʾān, but some draw heavily on it and talk about its role for contemporary Muslims. Two of these are essentially expositions of what the authors consider to be the Qurʾānic message, directed at Muslim believers (al-Afghānī/ʿAbduh, al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā, 2:160-7; al-Afghānī/ʿAbduh, al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā wa-l-thawra, 128-34).

The Qurʾān is central to al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā’s discourse on Muslim unity: it is not only their revealed scripture that «can never be abrogated» (al-Afghānī/ʿAbduh, al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā, 1:222), but also the ruler of all Muslims and their «true imam» (al-Afghānī/ʿAbduh, al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā, 1:95); it orders them to defend their territories and drive back the invaders, and for as long as Muslims recite it, there is still hope for them to regain their former status and power. It contains all the virtues that they need in order to achieve this, especially courage, as true believers know that they will die whenever God wills it and that Paradise awaits them (al-Afghānī/ʿAbduh, al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā wa-l-thawra, 142-6). Since all Muslims share the same reverence for the Qurʾān, it can serve to unite them. This can only happen, however, when the religious scholars, the ʿulamāʾ, preach its message to the common people, which they currently neglect to do (al-Afghānī/ʿAbduh, al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā, 1:200). The Qurʾān also teaches Muslims about the lessons to be learned from the fate of earlier peoples who lost their faith and their unity, about God’s promises to the believers, and about their own responsibility to reform their umma (the community of Muslim believers), so that God will fulfil his promises to them. Compared to the Qurʾān, the prophetic sunna plays a very minor role in al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā (Jomier, Revue).

Several Qurʾānic themes and verses occur repeatedly. The most frequent of them, and one that does not recur in ʿAbduh’s later writings, is jihād, in the explicit sense of every believer’s obligation to give his property and life for God’s cause (Q 9:111). Jihād in order to defend or reclaim Muslim territories is considered the most important duty that the Qurʾān assigns to believers. According to ʿAbduh and al-Afghānī, the Qurʾān, very much in contrast to Christianity, makes it the primary responsibility of Muslims to acquire the utmost prowess in the art of warfare (cf. Q 8:60) in every single sūra (al-Afghānī/ʿAbduh, al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā, 1:90-1). Frequent emphasis on the duty to give away one’s wealth, besides fighting, suggests that fundraising might have been an at least equally important concern here. A second recurrent theme is taken from Q 3:118 and 60:1, which are read as an interdiction against confiding in foreigners; more specifically, rulers should not employ Europeans in their service. Furthermore, ʿAbduh and al-Afghānī derive from the Qurʾān (e.g. Q 22:46) an obligation on Muslims to travel in order to learn about the reasons why earlier peoples fell into ruin. They should be aware that it is their own responsibility to reform themselves so that God will help them to escape that fate (Q 13:11, 8:35). Their current deplorable state should not be a cause for despair, for only the unbelievers despair of God (Q 12:87; 15:56). Rather, they should enjoin good and forbid wrong (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar; Q 3:110, 7:157, 9:71, 9:112, 22:41). The main addressees of this last theme are the ʿulamāʾ, who are criticised repeatedly and exhorted to revive the message of the Qurʾān among the believers. Finally, ʿAbduh and al-Afghānī point to the Qurʾānic principle of consultation (shūrā; Q 3:159, 42:38) in order to reproach the rulers of Muslim countries for their autocratic rule.

The Risālat al-tawḥīd and the Qurʾān

Muḥammad ʿAbduh’s best-known work is Risālat al-tawḥīd, usually translated as «The theology of unity.» It is based upon the lectures that he gave at the Sulṭāniyya school in Beirut between 1885 and 1888. The book was only published in 1897 and seems to have received little attention at first; its fame is based on the posthumous second edition that elided some particularly controversial statements (Sedgwick, 63-4). It is an introductory textbook targeted at a non-specialist readership and is therefore concise and comprehensible while not presenting every detail of ʿAbduh’s religious views (Büssow, 279). As such, it does not treat the Qurʾān systematically. However, the Qurʾān does play a central part in ʿAbduh’s argument (Sedgwick, 66) since its authenticity and authoritativeness as the primary source of Islam are beyond any doubt. Conversely, ʿAbduh argues for caution in the use of ḥadīth, and never suggests that ḥadīths are a way in which contemporary Muslims can establish a connection with the Prophet Muḥammad (Büssow, 295).

It is ʿAbduh’s basic premise that the Qurʾān as a divine revelation does not contradict reason; rather, it is the only divine scripture that combines revelation and reason to the full extent (Büssow, 294). Since it provides arguments, proofs, and refutations of counter-arguments, its message should be accepted not only because of its divine provenance, but also because of its inherent logic (L’Hopital, 141). Despite his emphasis on the role of reason, ʿAbduh considers revelation to be necessary for humans because, while the existence of God can be logically deducted, not all aspects and attributes of the divine realm can. Besides, human nature prevents humans from acting according to the dictates of reason at all times, which is why people and societies need guidance in order to function (Sedgwick, 65). Yet there can be no contradiction between revelation and reason; if it appears that this is the case then there must be a misunderstanding on the part of the reader (L’Hopital, 141). ʿAbduh conceives of the Qurʾānic message as a doctrine of liberation: men are created free and equal, and Islam liberates them from the submission under the will of men as well as from superstitions. The Qurʾān also lays down principles for a rational order of society. The pre-eminence of the first generations, the salaf, lies in the fact that they followed these principles (Sedgwick, 66-7). The punishment stories in the Qurʾān teach humans about the fate of people who refused to do the same.

Risālat al-tawḥīd’s chapter on the Qurʾān, which in the overall dramatic structure of the book just precedes the climax (Büssow, 284-5), is largely concerned with offering proof for the Qurʾān’s divine origin. According to ʿAbduh, the Qurʾān convinced its first listeners through its rhetorical inimitability (iʿjāz); it even uttered a challenge to produce a text like it in the so-called taḥaddī verses (Q 10:37; 11:13; 17:88), but despite the intellectual and rhetorical brilliance that ʿAbduh attests of the Arabs at the time of the Prophet, they were unable to meet this challenge. It is inconceivable, ʿAbduh argues, that an illiterate prophet could have produced such a text. Moreover, the Qurʾān contains historical predictions that later became true, which is another proof of its divine origin. Therefore, all contents of the Qurʾān have to be treated as God’s truthful revelation, including the statement that Muḥammad is the seal of the prophets (khātam al-anbiyāʾ, Q 33:40) (ʿAbduh, Risāla, 93-7). However, the Qurʾān is, according to ʿAbduh, firmly embedded in the culture, language, society, and intellectual horizon of its first audience. Therefore, only the first generation of Muslims was able to understand it without explanation. The interpretation of the Qurʾān is thus not only permissible, but also necessary, and it needs to take the characteristics of early seventh-century Arab society into account (Büssow, 290).

There is some scholarly controversy over ʿAbduh’s position in the theological debate surrounding the createdness of the Qurʾān. While a number of scholars believed that ʿAbduh was strongly in favour of the Muʿtazilī creed (Haddad, 209-15; Caspar, 157-65), others have pointed out that ʿAbduh merely refutes the position that the recited Qurʾān is uncreated while stating that it comes from a source that is coeternal with God (ʿAbduh, Risāla, 28). Furthermore, in the Risāla ʿAbduh criticises both the Muʿtazilī and the traditionalist position as extremes that created strife and distracted Muslims from overall consensus on the important elements of belief (Hildebrandt, 240; 252-5).

ʿAbduh’s commentaries on the Qurʾān

In 1898, the Syrian Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1860—1935) came to Cairo to publish a journal and meet Muḥammad ʿAbduh, whom he knew about from reading al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā. Riḍā apparently tried to convince ʿAbduh to write a tafsīr with a message similar to that of al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā, but ʿAbduh was sceptical about the impact of the written word, especially on an audience that he judged to be generally unwilling to benefit from it, one that included the ʿulamāʾ, of whom he had a very low opinion. Moreover, he believed, much of what needs to be said about the Qurʾān is already contained in the works of previous scholars and need not be repeated. Finally, interpreting the entire Qurʾān in an appropriate manner was an undertaking that ʿAbduh thought to be impossible to complete within one lifetime. Nevertheless, ʿAbduh started to give exegetical lectures at al-Azhar in 1899 with the explicit aim of focussing on those aspects that had not been discussed by earlier exegetes. His lectures discussed every verse of the Qurʾān consecutively, from its beginning to Q 4:125. Riḍā started to publish these lectures, as well as occasional other exegetical pieces, in his journal al-Manār in 1900 (ʿAbduh/Riḍā, 1:12-15). He then had the complete commentary on the first sūra, together with an introduction to Qurʾānic exegesis and three further exegetical articles, printed as a book under the title Tafsīr al-Fātiḥa in 1901. It does not constitute a verbatim transcript of ʿAbduh’s lectures, but Riḍā’s summaries of them that were checked by ʿAbduh before publication and contain very few additions by Riḍā.

The Tafsīr al-Fātiḥa goes through the first sūra, the Fātiḥa, verse by verse and word by word. It encompasses some of ʿAbduh’s central exegetical ideas and embodies his vision of the Qurʾān as a book of guidance (ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 28). According to ʿAbduh, the Qurʾān was sent to promulgate five central themes, all of which are contained in the Fātiḥa: the oneness of God (tawḥīd), the promise of the hereafter, the duty of worship (ʿibāda), the path to happiness, and the stories of people and peoples who were obedient to God, as well as those who transgressed God’s limits (ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 23). Furthermore, the Fātiḥa, by its repeated invocation of God’s mercy and compassion (Q 1:1, 1:3), defines these as the central attributes of God from which all others originate (ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 36-7).

The three exegetical articles that also form part of Tafsīr al- Fātiḥa (ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 64-123) had originally been published in al-Manār. The first discusses a passage from the Qurʾān that appears to contain a contradiction concerning the responsibility of humans for their fate (Q 4:78-9); ʿAbduh aims at resolving it on both a philosophical and a psychological level. The second and third texts are distinctly apologetic. In one of them, ʿAbduh discusses the «Satanic Verses» or «Story of the Cranes» (qiṣṣat al-gharānīq) and comes to reject it since it suggests that Muḥammad might have mistaken an utterance made by the devil for a divine revelation. With similar intent, in his commentary on Q 33:36-7, ʿAbduh rejects the mainstream version of the story of Zayd and Zaynab, which is usually considered the occasion of revelation for these verses. This version claims that Muḥammad desired his adopted son Zayd’s wife, Zaynab, for her beauty, but hesitated to marry her after Zayd had repudiated her for the sole reason that Arab custom forbade the marriage with one’s son’s former wife. Thereupon, Q 33:37 expressly allowed Muḥammad the union that he yearned for. According to ʿAbduh, however, the Prophet Muḥammad was above such personal desires. Rather, he was ordered by God to marry Zaynab in order to demonstrate to the Arabs, by his own example, that their custom of considering an adopted son equal to a biological son was null and void in the eyes of God. In both cases, ʿAbduh strove to defend Muḥammad’s sinlessness (ʿiṣma) against insinuations to the contrary, a defence that was probably primarily directed at European orientalists.

The exegetical work that is most commonly associated with ʿAbduh is the Qurʾānic commentary known as Tafsīr al-manār; its official title is Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ḥalīm (in later editions: al-ḥakīm). However, this work is the most problematic source for ʿAbduh’s exegesis. It is based on the transcripts of ʿAbduh’s lectures on Q 1:1 to 4:125 that were first published in al-Manār. ʿAbduh, according to Riḍā, checked and amended most of the material that Riḍā published and gave his consent to publication, but that process ended with his unexpected death at which point only the first sūra and half of the second had been published (Jomier, Commentaire, 50-4; ʿAbduh/Riḍā, 1:15-6). Even with respect to these texts, the approval that ʿAbduh gave apparently only extends to those transcripts of his lectures that were published in the journal al-Manār and the Tafsīr al-Fāṭiḥa. Publication of Tafsīr al-manār, as a separate Qurʾānic commentary intended to cover the entire Qurʾān, only started after ʿAbduh’s death. Riḍā included within it extensive comments on and additions to ʿAbduh’s lectures that ʿAbduh had presumably never seen; after Q 4:125, Riḍā continued the commentary on his own, meaning that no more than roughly 15 % of the material in the Tafsīr al-manār goes back to ʿAbduh or to Riḍā’s summaries of ʿAbduh’s lectures. Moreover, there is a general tendency, on Riḍā’s part, to soften and marginalise ʿAbduh’s more controversial views (Haddad, 220-2); this he accomplishes by embedding ʿAbduh’s lectures into his own commentary. There is a great discrepancy in length between ʿAbduh’s brief comments and Riḍā’s extensive ones after the end of the second juzʾ (Q 2:252) — that is, in those parts that ʿAbduh had not personally checked and amended. In the case of disagreement between Riḍā and ʿAbduh, Riḍā often tried to harmonise both views by adding to ʿAbduh’s opinions or interpreting them in certain ways (see, e.g., ʿAbduh/Riḍā, 1:34-5, 38; 4:339-78). The material in the Tafsīr al-manār should thus be treated with considerable caution when used as a source for ʿAbduh’s thought, although in most cases — with a few exceptions — Riḍā clearly marks which parts are from ʿAbduh and which are his own (Jomier, Commentaire, 51-2). Very occasionally, Riḍā mentions that the entire commentary on a specific verse was put into writing by ʿAbduh (cf. ʿAbduh/Riḍā, 1:235; 2:275), in which case the material might be comparatively more reliable than the transcripts of ʿAbduh’s lectures.

Far less well-known than the Tafsīr al-manār, and hardly studied, is ʿAbduh’s commentary on the thirtieth part of the Qurʾān, the juzʾ ʿamma that comprises sūras 78 to 114. Since these, along with the Fātiḥa, are the shortest chapters of the Qurʾān, they usually form the basis of introductory teaching of the Qurʾān; therefore, commentaries on the juzʾ ʿamma are common and usually have a pedagogical purpose. The Tafsīr juzʾ ʿamma is no exception. ʿAbduh wrote it during a stay in Geneva in 1903 and meant it to be a teaching manual for instructors in schools that belonged to the Muslim Benevolent Society, which he presided over at the time (Jomier, Commentaire, 52). The commentary was first published by the Egyptian khedival press in 1904. The ideas and interpretations he presented in the Tafsīr juzʾ ʿamma are often original (see, for example, ʿAbduh’s allegorical reading of the oath in Q 95: Juzʾ ʿamma, 118-9).

On Q 103, which is discussed as part of the Tafsīr juzʾ ʿamma, ʿAbduh also wrote a separate and longer commentary in 1903 that was based on a lecture he given made to the local ʿulamāʾ during his stay in Algeria that year. The Tafsīr sūrat al-ʿaṣr was first published in al-Manār (ʿAbduh, Aʿmāl, 5:501, n. 1; 505, n. 1) and thereafter as a booklet. ʿAbduh sees Q 103 (sūrat al-ʿaṣr) as one of the central segments of the Qurʾān; it is coupled, in his opinion, with Q 92 (sūrat al-layl), as both incorporate the fundamental ethical message of the Qurʾān, point to man’s capacity to distinguish between good and bad deeds, and promise happiness in reward for moral behaviour. Man is thus solely responsible for his fate, and adherence to any specific religion neither guarantees nor precludes access to paradise; rather, virtue is decisive (ʿAbduh, Aʿmāl, 5:505-21).

ʿAbduh on exegesis

The introductions to Tafsīr al-Fātiḥa and Tafsīr al-manār both contain a short but systematic exposition of ʿAbduh’s exegetical and hermeneutical thought that, according to Riḍā, is based on the contents, though not the exact words, of a lecture by ʿAbduh, «simplified and clarified» by Riḍā (ʿAbduh/Riḍā, 1:17) and presumably approved by ʿAbduh himself. In this text, ʿAbduh classifies the interpretation of the Qurʾān as an extremely important, but also extremely difficult endeavour since it implies transmitting the message of God, who is transcendent and beyond the realm of human understanding, to a human audience. Nevertheless, the Qurʾān commands humans to try to understand it. This understanding should be based on a vision of the Qurʾān as divine guidance to happiness in this world and the hereafter. ʿAbduh discusses a number of traditional exegetical methods some of which, like semantics, grammar, theological debate, and exhortations, he considers legitimate, while others are less so. For example, he rejects allegorical approaches to the Qurʾān. He also accuses the narrative branches of exegesis of indiscriminately drawing on unreliable and often superstitious stories of Jewish or Christian origin (isrāʾīliyyāt). Unlike many other scholars, however, he expressly excludes the Jewish and Christian Bible from that category (ʿAbduh, Aʿmāl, 4:9-10).

According to ʿAbduh, it is incumbent upon every believer to try to understand the Qurʾān according to their own intellectual level. ʿAbduh strongly criticises popular beliefs about the Qurʾān that relate to its use in healing, or the act of listening to Qurʾānic recitations for purely emotional reasons, without any understanding of its contents (ʿAbduh, Aʿmāl, 4:17). As well as the level of understanding that every believer should strive for, there is a higher level of understanding that cannot be attained by everyone and therefore is considered a farḍ kifāya — a duty that should be fulfilled by some, but not necessarily all members of the community of believers. ʿAbduh mentions five requirements for reaching this higher level of understanding. First, an exegete needs to be able to understand Qurʾānic terminology without succumbing to the error of understanding words according to their later or current meanings. Ideally, they should instead be understood by drawing on other instances in which the same term is used in the Qurʾān, by taking into account their Qurʾānic context, and by reading them in the light of the overall goals and message of the Qurʾān. Second, an exegete should be well-versed in grammar, rhetoric, and the usages of the Arabic language. Thirdly, he should have a profound understanding of the functioning of individuals and societies in order to contextualise the historical references in the Qurʾān and its teachings about the fate of peoples. Fourth, he needs to be familiar with the horizon of the first listeners of the Qurʾān, and fifth, he needs to know the life of the Prophet and his Companions; this final point is treated with conspicuous brevity (ʿAbduh, Aʿmāl, 4:12-5, 18-9). Moreover, ʿAbduh does not mention ḥadīth as a source of exegesis anywhere in his exposition. Mastery of the Arabic language is a much more important concern for him, possibly for nationalist as well as religious reasons.

ʿAbduh is highly critical of the Muslim exegetical tradition that, he claims, is preoccupied with discussing the views of earlier exegetical authorities instead of focussing on the purposes of revelation. This brand of exegesis is, in his opinion, not only a pointless endeavour, but it also constitutes taqlīd, the adherence to the word of men instead of the word of God — a term that had hitherto been mainly used within the field of Islamic law. Furthermore, according to ʿAbduh, the classical exegetes’ acceptance of a multitude of interpretations constitutes ikhtilāf («strife»), which Q 4:82 mentions as occurring only over texts that have no divine origin (ʿAbduh, Aʿmāl, 4:16). Despite this scathing criticism of the Muslim exegetical tradition, there are a few pre-modern exegetes whose works ʿAbduh considers valuable. Much in line with the Azharī tradition (Saleh, Historiography, 10-1), he mentions the merits of the Qurʾānic commentaries by al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) and, unlike many later modernists, has no objections against the latter’s extensive use of philosophical arguments and the former’s Muʿtazilī leanings (ʿAbduh, Aʿmāl, 4:10; 10, n. 1).

Methods and central themes of ʿAbduh’s exegesis

ʿAbduh frequently takes Qurʾānic verses as starting points for lectures on various topics that at times might give the impression that his works are «not really about tafsīr» (Sedgwick, 85). However, many aspects of his Qurʾānic commentaries are entirely in line with established methods of tafsīr. ʿAbduh comments on the Qurʾān segment by segment, often discusses the meaning of individual terms, and frequently refers to existing exegetical opinions, albeit without mentioning names, which many previous commentaries did not do either. His attempt to measure the Qurʾān against external ideological structures is another feature typical of works of tafsīr (Calder, 105-6). Nor are semantic and syntactical discussions absent from ʿAbduh’s commentary, although he only employs them selectively, especially when they conform to his understanding of the Qurʾān.

The one truly atypical feature of his commentary, when compared to the bulk of pre-modern exegesis, is its emphasis on guidance (Jansen, 24); on providing the true meaning of the Qurʾān without allowing for polyvalent readings or ambiguity. For ʿAbduh, this means that it is futile to discuss issues that cannot be resolved with any degree of certainty, such as the disjointed letters at the beginnings of many sūras (Amīn, 159; Jansen, 25). Furthermore, it means that the context in which a specific revelation occurred is of limited importance since the Qurʾān’s message is universal. It also means that the Qurʾān is coherent and must be treated as such, not in the atomistic manner with which many previous exegetes have treated it. ʿAbduh therefore takes the structure of sūras and the context of verses into account and reads the Qurʾān as a continuous narrative, rather than as an array of individual verses (Amīn, 159-60).

ʿAbduh’s method of exegesis is not particularly systematic (Nispen tot Sevenaer, Activité, 473), which is probably largely due to the fact that he did not set out to write a complete tafsīr and that he saw no point in repeating discussions that had already been led by previous exegetes. His commentaries oscillate between universalist discourses and discussions of details such as variant readings (qirāʾāt) or semantic differentiations that often aim at proving the inimitability of Qurʾānic language (Amīn, 160-1; cf. ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 30-4). That language, in ʿAbduh’s opinion, is generally clear; but he opposes excessively literal, physical, and anthropomorphic interpretations of verses describing transcendental matters such as God and the hereafter (Amīn, 163-4).

ʿAbduh’s exegetical works have some distinct common methodological features and themes. For one thing, in none of them is he particularly interested in ḥadīths. He quotes them occasionally when they support his interpretation (Jansen, 27) or when he considers them famous enough to warrant explicit rejection. When he does reject them, he is not interested in their degree of authenticity according to the criteria of ḥadīth scholarship, but in whether they match his notion of the Qurʾān’s message (cf. ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 55, where a famous ḥadīth is quoted as a mere opinion and then discarded). The only possible way to avoid illicit innovations (bidaʿ) that distort the true path of religion and cause strife between sects and schools is to base one’s opinions and interpretations solely on the Qurʾān (ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 62).

The concept of education, closely linked to that of guidance, is central to ʿAbduh’s tafsīr. Not only are his works pedagogical in nature, but the notion of education (tarbiya) as one of God’s main purposes for humans, both through the promise of a reward and the threat of punishment (ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 40), pervades his exegesis. The Qurʾān is, of course, the ultimate textbook for that education.

ʿAbduh consistently and often polemically rejects all forms of reliance on human authorities, which he labels taqlīd. This is frequently coupled with scathing criticism of the contemporary ʿulamāʾ. When ʿAbduh digresses from his universalist rhetoric, it is usually in order to point to negative examples, on the part of the Egyptian ʿulamāʾ, of taqlīd, hostility to independent reflection, the refusal to enjoin good and forbid wrong, a preoccupation with technicalities instead of the spirit of the scripture, the promotion of ignorance instead of rationality and knowledge, a staunch refusal to travel, study history, or learn foreign languages, moral depravity, and hypocrisy (cf. ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 54).

In place of taqlīd, ʿAbduh emphasises reason (ʿaql) as a quality that humans are endowed with and that conforms with revelation. Revelation might act as a corrective when reason and perception lead humans to faulty moral conclusions; but by the same token, reason is indispensable for avoiding false interpretations of religious commandments that might conform with their letter, but not their spirit (ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 48-52). Reason and revelation are interdependent and never in contradiction with each other (Jansen, 18-34).

A central concept of ʿAbduh’s exegesis is the Qurʾānic notion of sunan Allāh: the rules that God has set for his creation and never digresses from. These pertain, first, to the natural world: God has established natural laws that he will not bend, be it for the sake of magic or miracles. Both are phenomena whose existence ʿAbduh denies vehemently, maintaining that they can be explained scientifically (Jansen, 31; Shiḥāta, 105-26). ʿAbduh also occasionally mentions scientific discoveries like the theory of evolution or electricity (Amīn, 164-5). This is not as prominent a feature as with proponents of the «scientific exegesis» (tafsīr ʿilmī), however; ʿAbduh merely does not see science in conflict with religion (Wielandt, Exegesis. Early modern and contemporary, 129). Evolution, for example, clearly fits into his conception of sunan Allāh since it is a set of rules that rely on immanent causes and effects, not on God’s constant intervention; but these rules have been created by God who is their first cause. The distinction between first cause and immanent causalities (cf. ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 44-7, 64-71) is important to him in order to hold humans responsible for their deeds for which, he maintains, all intents and purposes, they are accountable, despite pointless scholastic debates on free will; after all, there has to be some accountability in this world or the hereafter (ʿAbduh, Aʿmāl, 5:517-9).

A further aspect of ʿAbduh’s notion of sunan Allāh is the belief that all humans were created with a natural disposition (fiṭra) that enables them to recognise the existence of God and distinguish between good and evil (Jomier, Raison, 20-4). The most frequent and pervasive application of the notion of sunan Allāh to ʿAbduh’s understanding of the Qurʾān, however, is found in his ideas about history and the evolution of societies; here, he expands upon themes that had already featured prominently in his earlier writings. The Qurʾān, ʿAbduh argues, frequently enjoins Muslims to consider the fates of earlier peoples and to learn from their example (ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 57) because this will enable not only individuals but whole nations to attain happiness and success. God’s sunan serve as an explanation for the current weakness of Muslim societies since God does not reward nations who are lazy, complacent, and ignorant. Rather, God only rewards moral societies that foster scientific inquiry and learning. The key Qurʾānic term here is, for ʿAbduh, ṣabr (perseverance), which he considers the central value upon which all other moral values are built (ʿAbduh, Aʿmāl, 5:505-21; on sunan Allāh, see Nispen tot Sevenaer, Activité).

The core message of the Qurʾān, for ʿAbduh, is thus an ethical one. Adherence to a specific religion and the observance of its laws are, in contrast, of negligible importance. «The religion of God is one in all peoples. Only the rulings about the practical details (furūʿ) differ according to the changing historical circumstances. As to the fundamentals (uṣūl), there is no difference.» Rituals have the sole purpose of helping people focus on the basic tenets of morality that all religions share; if they do not practice that morality, however, the rituals are futile (ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 57). According to ʿAbduh, the Qurʾān affirms that all divine religions share the belief in the one God and in prophethood as well as a common conception of virtues and the obligation to do good. The moral categories of good and evil can be understood either through divine guidance or through rational thought, by freeing the mind from all shackles of superstition and customs. Whoever has recognised good and evil has the duty to bring this truth to others, otherwise he will earn no reward. In a radical deviation from conventional wisdom, ʿAbduh clarifies that the term «those who believe» (Q 103:3) is not restricted to any particular religious community. It includes those who received a prophet’s message, believe in it and do good, as well as those who have not received such a message, but know the principle of good and evil, act accordingly, and believe in an ultimate arbiter who will judge and then reward or punish all men justly. This arbiter is explicitly not labelled as allāh, but in extremely general terms as a higher being or ruler (ḥākim/musayṭir) (ʿAbduh, Aʿmāl, 5:501-3, 508). ʿAbduh restricts this universalism to Islam and pre-Islamic religions; neither atheism nor post-Qurʾānic religions are on the same level. However, even here, ʿAbduh cautiously withholds making a definitive judgement (ʿAbduh, Fātiḥa, 59-60).

Reception

Muḥammad ʿAbduh’s influence has been considered enormous by some (Adams, 1-2; Hourani, 130; Shiḥāta, 195) and marginal by others (L’Hopital, 139-40). ʿAbduh’s Qurʾānic exegesis, in particular, continues to exert an influence in specific areas, such as his stance on polygamy, which he shared with other thinkers of his time, most notably the Indian Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1817-98). His unitarian take on religion remains more contested. Even the Turkish exegete Süleyman Ateş (b. 1933), who was convinced that Christians and Jews may enter paradise, did not adopt ʿAbduh’s approach from Tafsīr al-manār, but Rashīd Riḍā’s much more restricted perspective (Pink, 249, 266-7), while the Azhar continued to fiercely condemn both ideas as heresy (ilḥād) (Pink, 246).

Whereas some of ʿAbduh’s positions on the advancement of the Muslim nations through a nineteenth-century notion of progress might appear outdated today, he was a trendsetter — at least in the Arab world, if not in India — in many ways. First, his understanding of the Qurʾān as a source of unambiguous guidance to mankind constitutes a very modern conception of tafsīr that turned out to be enormously influential (Pink, 301-6). Moreover, his approach opened a space for sustained personal reflection on the meaning of the Qurʾān for the believer’s life. The focus of this reflection was an ethical one which, again, is a trend that continues to be of great significance in Qurʾānic exegesis. Finally, ʿAbduh clearly and explicitly sets the Qurʾān above all other religious sources and discourses, marginalising both the Sunna and the authority of earlier scholars. This distinguishes him from other reformist Muslim scholars of his time, including Rashīd Riḍā. Other aspects of his exegesis fit into broader trends in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially the rejection of so-called isrāʾīliyyāt (Tottoli) and of «pointless» theological speculation.

The reception of ʿAbduh’s works has moved outside just the Arab world, as evidenced by a number of translations. His Tafsīr juzʾ ʿamma was translated into Indonesian as soon as 1924, and in 2012 a Turkish translation of this work and the Tafsīr al-Fātiḥa was published. Both in Turkey and Indonesia, the modernist approach to exegesis that is represented by ʿAbduh seems to be distinctly more popular than in the Arab world itself (Pink 2011, 311). However, while the Tafsīr al-manār is not widely available and has not been frequently quoted in Egypt in recent decades, certain aspects of its approach are evident in works by Egyptian Islamists, starting with Sayyid Quṭb (1906-66). They might not necessarily agree with ʿAbduh in his views towards polygamy, other religions, or the role of reason, but they have entirely appropriated his guidance-oriented, personal approach (van Nispen tot Sevenaer, Commentaire).

Johanna Pink

Bibliography

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